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Ellen Hertz’s manifold critique of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
paradoxically begins by establishing common ground with the ardent 
defender of free market capitalism and an otherwise political opponent 
to her normative framework, Milton Friedman. Building on his analyti­
cal framework, according to which corporations and government op­
erate on different principles, Hertz reinforces the idea that CSR cannot 
and should not replace democratic mechanisms in the determination of 
the public interest. In addition, following established critiques of CSR 
(e.g., Shamir 2008), Hertz highlights that CSR introduces the logics of 
the market in areas traditionally governed by different logics of action, 
while it also serves to obfuscate relations of power and to shape global 
governance in corporate­friendly directions.
I agree with the broad lines and the spirit of the argument proposed 
by Hertz. Yet, I would like to suggest, first, one complication—and, per­
haps, revision—of the argument against the reliance on CSR, which 
stems from a problematization of the rigidity of the public/private dis­
tinction. Second, I would also like to propose a nuancing of the critique, 
which relates to the diverse ways legal imaginaries of socio­ecological 
transformation can become purposeful.
Hertz suggests that it is ‘the public’ that must set the rules for 
business, not corporations. However, it is often ‘the public’ itself, in the 
sense of the organized polity, that establishes rules that rely on CSR and 
societal self­regulation. CSR is not the result of a legal vacuum that cor­
porations rush to fill in order to advance their interests, but rather the 
deliberate product of a legal architecture relying on decentralization, 
pluralism, and reflexivity to advance public and social goals. The gene­
alogy of this turn to decentralization and proximity in regulation (Black 
2001) can partly be traced to the pervasiveness of the neoliberal view of 
the globalized economy as hyper­complex and ‘unknowable’ (Slobodian 
2018), which disarmed visions of economic planning and top­down 
regulation. CSR purports to be meaningful in response to ‘governance 
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gaps’ (Ruggie 2008) that result from the disjunction between the trans­
national nature of networks of production and the national character 
of regimes of responsibility and liability. Building on the recognition 
of lead firms as core actors of global economic governance and as pro­
ducers of normative orders that materially govern supply chains (Bair 
2005; The IGLP Working Group 2016), the idea is to embed social values 
in the operations of lead firms by exposing them to societal pressures. 
Some examples of such a regulatory approach are found in the EU Di­
rective 2014/95 on non-financial disclosures, the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights, or the UK Modern Slavery Act. Public 
authority relies then on transparency, social expectations, and market 
dynamics, as opposed to legal sanctions, to steer corporate conduct. Yet, 
such ‘social expectations’ are not created in a vacuum but reflect pre- 
existing social inequalities and market power. As CSR—and corporate 
self-governance more broadly—becomes a core feature of new forms of 
market regulation that aspire to social and environmental sustainabil­
ity, critical voices should shift the focus from an uncomplicated defence 
of the ‘public’ against ‘the private’ to how ‘the public’ may facilitate the 
expression of private power and the reification of asymmetries of social 
power into legal arrangements (Kampourakis forthcoming).
Just as the notion of ‘public’ needs to be problematized, disen­
tangling its descriptive from its normative component, so do the  concepts 
‘private’, ‘business’, and ‘market’ need to be unpacked. The notion that 
markets are a product of legal ordering (Hale 1923)  harbours the idea 
that a reconstitution of market dynamics by means of legal instruments 
is possible, nuancing perhaps the point that ‘until the replacement of 
capitalism’, business needs to be driven solely by profit-maximization. 
While the extent to which legal instruments alone can redirect this fun­
damental drive might indeed be inherently limited by social relations 
of production, tectonic shifts in legal arrangements could still have dra­
matic repercussions for the understanding of what constitutes ‘business’. 
If that is true, then the critique to CSR and to new forms of market reg­
ulation that rely on corporate ‘self­change’ should aim not only at their 
market­embedded nature but also at their structural inability to chal­
lenge the original institutional setup and how it generates market power 
and socio­economic inequalities. For instance, should legal reforms 
address both redistributive public law institutions and core aspects 
of the legal infrastructure of markets which make up ‘business’, such 
as, for example, the corporate form consisting of limited liability and 
shareholder primacy (Ireland 2010), then superstructural reforms like 
CSR might become meaningful. While the goal remains to place private 
power under democratic control and assert collective priorities over the 
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economy, the imaginaries of where public power is to be reconstituted 
need not be confined within the traditional structures of government.
The last point demonstrates the need for a flexible and mobile criti­
cal practice that can unfold within and beyond institutions (Poulantzas 
2008), corporations not excluded. In that sense, a critical practice that 
aspires to a democratic political economy (Britton-Purdy et al., 2020) 
may advance the reconstitution of public power and democratic control 
in different ways in different contexts and with varying expectations, 
including by means of public regulation, reconfiguration of private 
governance institutions, or expansion of non­capitalist spaces and non­ 
extractive economic practices.
uw
Ioannis Kampourakis is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Erasmus School 
of Law, Erasmus University Rotterdam. Email: kampourakis@law.eur.nl
vt
References
Bair, J. (2005), ‘Global capitalism and commodity chains: Looking back, going for­
ward’, Competition & Change 9, no. 2: 153–180.
Black, J. (2001), ‘Decentring regulation: Understanding the role of regulation and 
self­regulation in a “post­regulatory” world’, Current Legal Problems 21: 103–146.
Britton-Purdy et al. (2020), ‘Building a law-and-political-economy framework: 
Beyond the twentieth­century synthesis’, Yale Law Journal 129: 1784–1835.
Hale, R. L. (1923), ‘Coercion and distribution in a supposedly non-coercive state’, 
Political Science Quarterly 38: 470–494.
Ireland, P. (2010), ‘Limited liability, shareholder rights and the problem of corporate 
irresponsibility’, Cambridge Journal of Economics 34: 837–856.
Kampourakis, I. (forthcoming), ‘The Postmodern Legal Ordering of the Economy’ 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies.
Poulantzas, N. and J. Martin (eds) (2008), The Poulantzas Reader: Marxism, Law and 
the State (Brooklyn, NY: Verso).
Ruggie, J. (2008), ‘Protect, respect and remedy: A framework for business and 
human rights’, (Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other busi­
ness enterprises, 7 April 2008).
Shamir, R. (2008), ‘Corporate social responsibility: Towards a new market-embed­
ded morality?’ Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9, no. 2: 371–394.
Slobodian, Q. (2018), Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism (Cam­
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
The IGLP Law and Global Production Working Group (2016), ‘The role of law in 
global value chains: a research manifesto’, London Review of International Law 
4, no. 1: 57–79.
